Achievement of the health-related Millennium Development Goals is dependent on increasing take-up of preventive public health services (PHSs) in developing countries. Poor country governments often lack the resources to provide optimal access to preventive services and a great deal of attention is being directed towards the private sector to fill this void. In many developing countries, the private sector already plays a large role in health care. However, the for-profit private sector has little incentive to provide PHSs. The lack of provision of services by the for-profit sector may create a barrier to take-up of these services. In this study, we use data from a census of health facilities combined with data from community and provider surveys from Kenya to analyse whether the private for-profit sector has lower provision rates of child immunization services, and subsequently whether this creates a barrier that results in lower immunization take-up. We show that only 34% of for-profit facilities provide immunizations and that in areas with a larger share of for-profit providers, children are more likely to have no immunization coverage. Our model predicts that the odds of a child receiving no immunization coverage are 4.8 times higher in areas where all health facilities are for-profit compared to areas with no for-profit facilities. This indicates that a policy of engagement with the private for-profit sector aimed at increasing provision of immunization services may be an effective strategy for increasing take-up.
Introduction
Finding ways of increasing take-up of preventive public health services (PHSs) is an important and urgent task. Many studies show that increased take-up of such services could have longterm positive impacts for the poor (Nevill et al. 1996; Hawley et al. 2003; Marks et al. 2005; Granich et al. 2009; Bleakley 2010; Cutler et al. 2010; Lucas 2010; Bloom 2011; Cleland et al. 2011) . Moreover, the achievement of the health-related Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is dependent on increasing take-up of these health services.
It is well known that private markets without government intervention provide PHSs at a sub-optimal level as the significant positive externalities of these services provide less value to the private organization than they do to society. In other words, increased take-up of these services not only benefits individuals receiving these services but also others in society. For example, increasing childhood vaccinations for infectious diseases provides herd immunity and thus benefits both vaccinated and non-vaccinated children. These positive externalities are often cited as the rationale for government intervention in health markets including direct public provision of PHSs at government health facilities (Folland et al. 2012) . However, government health infrastructure in several developing countries is notoriously inadequate and as a result the take-up of immunization services remains poor (Datar et al. 2007) . For example, recent data from the World Health Organization (WHO) show that more than 2 million people die annually of vaccine preventable diseases. Most of these deaths are among African children (WHO 2011) .
The inability of the public health infrastructure to achieve adequate take-up of PHSs naturally raises the question: can engagement with the private sector fill this void and increase take-up of essential PHSs?
The optimal role for the private sector in public health, however, remains a controversial issue, and the majority of investments in public health initiatives focus solely on the public sector. Some argue that private providers could be useful partners in achieving public health objectives (Smith et al. 2008) . Proponents of this argument suggest that the private sector controls valuable health infrastructure, and enhanced engagement and investment from governments and donors could increase access to health services (Berman 1998; Preker and Harding 2003; International Finance Corporation 2011) . Others argue that the private sector provides poor quality of care and limits access to the poor and, therefore, engagement should be limited (Brugha and Zwi 1998; Sauerborn 2001; Vinay 2001; Zwi et al. 2001; Chakraborty and Frick 2002; Hanson et al. 2008) . One thing that both sides of the debate agree upon is that the private sector is poorly understood. There may be potential for public-private partnerships to help bridge gaps in access to health care in poor countries, but a better understanding of its current role and impact on public health is necessary to know what interventions may be the most successful.
In many developing countries, the private sector already plays a large role in health care. In sub-Saharan Africa, private providers account for as much as 50% of health care provision (International Finance Corporation 2011) . People are reported to prefer the private sector due to shorter waiting times, the perception of better quality and better customer service, among other things (Russell 2005) . However, if the private sector has limited provision of services that produce positive externalities, people using the private sector may miss out on these services. Small obstacles can be enough to dissuade people from using preventive health services as they provide little immediate benefit. For example, immunizing a child bears immediate costs, such as time off work and transport costs, but provides benefits only in the future. It is possible that lack of provision of PHS is enough of a barrier to dissuade take-up. If the barrier is there, it would indicate that government engagement designed to nudge the private sector to increase provision of these services may be an effective method of increasing take-up.
In this study, we used data from a provider survey in Kenya to examine whether the private for-profit sector has lower provision rates of immunization and HIV testing services. Next, we merged data from the census of private and public health facilities in Kenya to evaluate whether individuals in areas with a higher fraction of for-profit facilities had lower take-up of these services. Then, to further validate our identification strategy, we examine whether this effect is stronger in areas where the private sector is shown to provide immunizations at a lower rate. Finally, we describe the association between government engagement with the private sector and the provision of PHSs at private facilities.
Methods

Data
Service provision rates by provider ownership Data on services provided by health facilities were obtained from the Kenya Service Provision Assessment (KSPA) survey, which was administered in Kenya in 2010. The KSPA was implemented by the National Coordinating Agency for Population and Development in collaboration with the Ministry of Medical Services, the Ministry of Public Health and Sanitation and the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics. The survey involved a nationally representative sample of 695 facilities including hospitals, health centers, maternities, clinics, dispensaries and stand-alone voluntary counseling and testing facilities (VCTs) throughout Kenya. As pharmacies are not expected to provide immunization services, they are excluded from this analysis. Facilities were selected from all eight provinces of Kenya. The weighted sample of facilities consisted of 345 public, 237 for-profit, 89 faith-based and 24 NGO. Of these facilities there (Gachuhi et al. 2010) . This greatly increased the provision rates of HIV testing among the private sector, and is likely the reason why we find HIV testing provision rates to be higher than immunization service provision among private providers. Although HIV testing is provided at a higher rate by the for-profit sector, we include it in the analysis for comparison with our immunizations results, with the expectation of finding no significance.
Health facility ownership
The census of health facilities in Kenya was obtained from the Kenya Ministry of Health (see http://www.ehealth.or.ke/facilities/downloads.aspx, accessed 11 November 2011). The list used was up to date as of 2009 and contains characteristics of all health facilities in Kenya including ownership, facility type and geographic location, among other characteristics. We use this data to calculate the fraction of the total facilities in each administrative location that is owned by for-profit, non-profit and public providers. It is important to note that an administrative 'location' in Kenya is the second lowest level of administrative region used to make public health and planning decisions, and the lowest level available to us. Henceforth, when we refer to a 'location', we are referring to this level of administrative region. Prison hospitals, military hospitals, dentist offices, eye clinics, laboratories, radiology units, blood transfusion centers, pharmacies and academic facilities were excluded from the analysis. The census shows that 54% of facilities in Kenya are public, 32% are for-profit, 12% are faithbased and 2% are NGOs. Public and faith-based facilities are predominantly dispensaries (76 and 70%, respectively), which in Kenya are small outpatient facilities that provide basic primary care, whereas for-profit facilities are predominantly medical clinics (80%). NGOs are not found to predominantly own any particular facility type.
Public health service take-up
We use Kenya Demographic and Health Surveys (DHSs) data to measure PHS take-up rates. The DHS collects primary data using several types of questionnaires in more than 85 countries. For this analysis, we use household, individual adult and individual child level data from the Kenya DHS for 2008/2009. The DHS household data consisted of 9057 household interviews. Within households, individual interviews were given to all women aged 15-49 years and all men aged 15-55 years, resulting in 8444 women and 3465 men in the individual adult data set (women were more likely to be home). All mothers were asked to respond to questions about all their children under 5 years old, resulting in answers pertaining to 6079 children under 5 years old. We used Geographic Information Systems (GIS) software to geospatially match DHS cluster areas to Kenyan health facility administrative locations using GPS coordinates, which were collected for each DHS cluster area. The GIS shape file 2 used to match locations was accessed from 'Map Library' (http://www.maplibrary.org, accessed 11 November 2011). Matching cluster areas to administrative locations allowed us to link health provider characteristics from the health facility file to each DHS observation.
3
Variables
Provider ownership share variable Our main explanatory variable is a variable representing the share of the total health facilities in an administrative location that is for-profit. To calculate this variable, we used the health facility file to create a binary variable, which was set to one if the facility was characterized as for-profit by the Ministry of Health and set to zero if the facility was characterized as NGO, faith-based or publicly owned. The mean of this variable was taken for each administrative location to provide a value which represents the percentage of the total facilities that is for-profit at the administrative location level. The same process was undergone to calculate the share of public and non-profit facilities, the latter of which includes all facilities with NGO or faith-based ownership. To verify accuracy of the for-profit provider share variable, a variable representing whether a respondent has ever used a for-profit health provider was created using DHS data. We should expect greater for-profit use in areas that have a larger share of for-profit providers. The for-profit use variable is based on four DHS questions which indicate whether the respondent has ever used a private health provider in the recent past. The questionnaire asked the type of facility that was visited for medical treatment for child diarrhoea, child fever, child birth and contraception. A binary variable was created and set to one if the respondent reported visiting a for-profit medical facility for any of these services and set to zero if they sought treatment at another type of medical facility. This variable was plotted against the for-profit share variable to test for validity (see Figure 1) . We can see from Figure 1 that for-profit use is greater in areas that have a larger share of for-profit providers. This relationship is found to be significant using a probit regression model with demographic and geographic controls including regional fixed effects (P ¼ 0.002; coefficient ¼ 0.099). This provides confidence in the accuracy of this variable. The regression also shows that wealthier and more educated individuals are more likely to use private for-profit facilities. The poor, middle, rich and richest wealth groups are 7.5, 7.6, 18 and 25 percentage points, respectively, more likely than the poorest wealth group to have reported using a for-profit facility (regressions results are not reported in a table and are available from authors upon request).
Wealth index
We control for wealth using a wealth index created by the DHS, which is a composite measure of a household's cumulative living standard, which is calculated using data on a household's ownership of selected assets, such as televisions and bicycles; materials used for housing construction; and types of water access and sanitation facilities.
Dependent variables
Binary variables were created to measure immunization coverage and HIV testing. The variable for immunization coverage was taken from child level DHS data and set to one if the mother reported that her child under 5 years old had not received any of the recommended vaccines for Kenya (Bacillus Calmette-Guérin (BCG), Diphtheria, Pertussis, and Tetanus (DPT), polio and measles). If the mother reported her child to have received any one of these, this variable was set to zero. 4 The variable for HIV testing was taken from individual level DHS data and set to one if individuals aged 15-55 years reported receiving an HIV test in the last year and to zero otherwise.
Analysis approach
For our analysis of how for-profit provider share of the total providers affects the take-up rate of immunizations we estimate a logit regression model, which estimates the odds that each child has no immunization coverage based on a specific set of characteristics. We undergo the same process for HIV testing. The key explanatory variable of interest is the variable representing for-profit provider share of the total health providers, which was described earlier. We control for various demographic and geographic characteristics: wealth, education, number of children, age of mother and child, recalled birth size of child, hospitals per square metre, rural, gender and marital status (if applicable). We also control for average wealth, education, age and number of children for each respective administrative location. We include district-level fixed effects to control for observed and unobserved heterogeneity in district characteristics that may affect both the share of the providers that are for-profit and our dependent variables (i.e. government regulation, epidemiology, etc.). There were 150 districts in Kenya at the time of the census. Standard errors are clustered at the administrative location level.
Selection bias
It is possible that non-profit, for-profit and public ownership prevalence is not exogenous to immunization take-up as providers could choose the locations that they enter based on characteristics of people in these locations. We use various measures to account for this potential selection bias. First, we control for various determinants of immunization take-up, including district fixed effects, demographics and socioeconomic status at the administrative location and individual level.
Second, we conduct the same analysis using HIV testing as the dependent variable. As this service is provided with much greater frequency by the for-profit sector in Kenya relative to the public sector, we expect to find no effect. This serves as a robustness check as it is likely that any bias affecting immunization take-up will also affect HIV testing. If it is provider provision rates that are affecting take-up of immunizations then we should not find significant results for HIV testing.
Third, we test for differential effects of for-profit provider share based on variation in district level for-profit sector immunization provision rates. If for-profit share is causing PRIVATE SECTOR IMMUNIZATION SERVICE PROVISION lower immunization rates, this effect should be stronger in districts where the for-profit sector is found to provide immunizations at relatively lower rates. We use the KSPA data and GPS software to link the share of for-profit facilities that provide immunizations to the Kenya DHS data set at the district level. Then, we create two sets of interaction terms. The first consists of the for-profit share variable multiplied by a variable representing the share of for-profit providers that provide immunizations in the respective district. For the second set we categorize each district as being a low, middle or high for-profit provision rate district, which we classify based on the bottom, middle and top third of the distribution, respectively. We then interact these provision rate dummy variables with our for-profit share variable. We run two separate logit regressions, one which includes the continuous interaction term and the another including the categorical dummy interaction terms. If we correctly identify for-profit share as causing lower immunization take-up, we should find coefficients on these interaction terms to be significant, with greater magnitude at lower provision levels. District-level immunization provision is used instead of administrative location level due to the small facility sample size yielding too few facilities per each location to accurately portray immunization provision rates at this level. As our interaction terms are defined at the district level, we change our model to have regional fixed effects instead of district fixed effects to account for collinearity.
Nonetheless, even after these checks it is still possible that some unobserved factor is correlated with both immunization take-up and for-profit share. If this is true, it is possible that any relation we find between for-profit sector share and immunization take-up could be spurious. Table 2 shows average characteristics of areas with different levels of for-profit, public and non-profit share. Table 2 suggests that administrative locations with a greater for-profit share are richer, more educated and more developed with smaller households and fewer children under 5. Also, as we might expect, public and Robust standard errors in parentheses ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05, *P < 0. non-profit providers appear to have the opposite trend, with a larger share in poorer, less educated, less developed locations with larger family sizes and more children under 5. Previous research has shown that people in less developed, poorer and less educated areas are less likely to get immunized, which we confirm in this study (Gauri 2002; Nath et al. 2007 ). This would indicate that if a bias still exists after controlling for observables, the bias would lead us to underestimate the effects of private sector share on take-up of immunizations.
Results
The DHS cluster areas fell in 276 unique administrative locations. The mean for-profit share for these locations was 20% with a standard deviation of 0.28.
Immunizations Table 3 displays the odds ratios from the logit regressions. As expected, we find that people in administrative locations with a larger share of for-profit facilities are more likely to have no immunization coverage. The magnitude of the effect is large with an odds ratio of 4.86. 5 From Figure 2 we can see that the model predicts that a change from 0 to 100% in for-profit sector share would result in the fraction of children that have no immunization coverage to change from 7.4 to 23%, respectively. Wealth is shown to predict higher odds of immunization coverage. However, most of the vulnerability to no immunization coverage comes from the poorest wealth group, whereas there is less variation among the upper wealth groups. Education is also positively related to immunization coverage but the relationship is not statistically significant. In addition, no statistically significant relationship is found between non-profit share and immunization coverage.
HIV testing
We were unable to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between HIV testing and for-profit share. This is likely the result of the PITC programme in Kenya (described earlier), which may have caused the high-provision rate (59%) among for-profit providers.
Differential effects by for-profit immunization provision rates Table 4 reports the results from the logit regressions with the provision rate interaction terms inserted into the immunization model. Column 1 contains results with the interaction term of for-profit share and district immunization provision rates in its continuous form. We can see that the interaction term and the for-profit share variables are strongly significant, indicating that the effect of for-profit share on immunization take-up is stronger in areas where the for-profit sector is less likely to provide immunizations. The coefficient on for-profit share in this model represents the odds ratio only for districts where no for-profit providers provide immunizations. We can see that the magnitude of the coefficient on for-profit share increases compared with the model in Table 3 . 6 Figure 3 displays the results of this regression graphically by showing the effect of for-profit share on immunization rates under different for-profit provider provision scenarios. We can see from this figure that the effect of having a larger for-profit share on immunization coverage is much stronger in districts where the immunization provision rate in the for-profit sector was 25% (25th percentile) than when it was 37.5% (50th percentile). When immunization provision in the for-profit sector reaches 75% (75th percentile), nearly the rate of the public sector, the effect disappears completely. Column 2 reports results with the interaction terms classified into low, medium and high immunizations provision by the for-profit sector. The interaction for low provision is significant indicating that the effect is larger at low-provision levels. Table 3 ).
Although the odds ratio on the middle-provision level is 2.56, we cannot conclude that there is any differential effect of middle provision compared to high-provision areas.
These results help validate our identification strategy and add confidence to the internal validity of our main findings.
Discussion
We have shown that for-profit health facilities provide immunization services at low rates, and that this creates a barrier that causes lower take-up of these services. We control for selection bias with district-level fixed effects, administrative location level characteristics and various individual demographic covariates that are likely to determine immunization take-up. We also include HIV testing in our analysis, which is provided at a high rate by the for-profit sector. We assume that any bias is likely to have a similar effect on take-up of HIV testing as it would for immunizations. We find for-profit presence to have no effect on take-up of this service which adds confidence to our findings. We also validate our identification strategy by showing that the effect is only seen in areas where immunization service provision by the for-profit sector is found to be low. This provides evidence that it is for-profit share that is causing the low take-up we observe and not some confounding factor.
Understanding how best to utilize the private sector in achieving public health objectives is an important task. This study provides evidence that the lack of provision of immunizations by the private for-profit sector may be a barrier that results in lower take-up. It seems unlikely that people who choose to use for-profit facilities truly have no access to other facilities that provide immunizations. However, the lack of convenience creates an extra burden associated with immunizing a child. Interventions to remove obstacles and make the choice to use preventative services easier have shown to be effective at increasing take-up in the past in a developing country context (Thornton 2008; Banerjee et al. 2010; Cohen and Dupas 2010) .
The findings of this study indicate that a policy of engagement with the private sector designed to increase provision of immunizations may facilitate utilization of this service. Sood et al. (2011) provide evidence that government engagement can help influence the private sector to provide PHSs. They demonstrate that for-profit providers in Kenya that reported being offered assistance from the government (financial or technical) to help provide a service were more likely to provide that service than those that were not offered assistance. For example, of the private facilities that reported receiving government assistance for immunization services, nearly three-quarters provided immunizations. In contrast, of the private facilities that reported no assistance from the government for immunizations only a third provided immunizations. Although it seems like government engagement may be an important factor to help ensure that the private sector provides these services, Sood et al. (2011) also outline how public sector engagement with the private sector is extremely limited in Kenya. For example, only 29% of private facilities in Kenya reported receiving any technical or financial assistance for immunizations. Combining these findings with the main findings of this study suggests that increased engagement from the government with the private sector may be an effective method of increasing take-up of immunization services. The PITC campaign to increase HIV testing services in the private sector is a good example of how such engagement can be successful. A similar model should be used for immunizations. If increased engagement can influence for-profit providers to provide immunization services at a similar rate as they do HIV testing services, we are likely to see reduced disparities in immunization take-up rates by for-profit share; however, some disparities might still remain.
As far as we know, this is the first study to address the causal effect of low-provision rates of immunization services in the for-profit sector. However, our research is limited in a variety of ways. First, our analysis is limited to one African country. Future research should focus on a wider range of countries in Robust standard errors in parentheses ***P < 0.01, **P < 0.05. Regression results include region-level fixed effects and control for location level wealth, education, age and number of children. Standard errors are clustered at the administrative location level.
Africa and around the globe to see if these findings are externally valid. Second, the results of our study could be driven by both differences by for-profit status in the level of infrastructure or the ability to provide immunization services and the decision to offer such immunization services conditional on access to such infrastructure. Unfortunately, we cannot disentangle which one of these sources of variation is more important in driving our results as we don't know which facilities have access to the qualified personnel and infrastructure that are necessary to provide immunizations services. However, the data on type of facility by ownership status suggests that private providers are more likely to have access to these resources. For example, for-profit facilities are mostly medical clinics, whereas public facilities are mostly dispensaries. It is not likely that dispensaries are more equipped to provide immunizations than are medical clinics. Third, we do not have information on the specific geographical locations of facilities. The proximity to different types of facilities may play an important role in the decision to get a child immunized. To mitigate these issues, future research should aim to obtain more detailed facility level data that includes resources and GPS co-ordinates of all facilities within the country of analysis.
Endnotes
1. VCTs were excluded when assessing immunization provision as they should not be expected to provide these services. 2. A shape file is a file containing a map that can be used for analysis in GIS software. 3. In some cases, administrative locations had different names in the GIS shape file than in the Ministry of Health's facility file. In such cases, expert judgement and local knowledge were used to change location names to facilitate matching between files. 4. The DHS records whether the mother reported that her child received the vaccine and whether each respective vaccination was marked on the child's vaccine card. If either occurred we consider the child to be immunized.
5. The results were also significant in the same direction for each individual vaccine (i.e. BCG, DPT, polio and measles) and when we restricted the sample to children <36 months of age. These results are not presented and are available from the authors upon request. 6. Coefficients are not directly comparable since the different geographic fixed effects used in the models affect the magnitude of the coefficient. When the model in Table 3 used regional instead of district fixed effects the odds ratio on for-profit share is 2.07 (P ¼ 0.05). This shows an even larger increase in magnitude when interaction terms are inserted.
